the British Invasions of 1813 - 1814, Part II
About Face to ... Part I
Part II, the Attacks on Washington and Baltimore.
Washington (Bladensburg)
Following the British landings at Benedict, Maryland on August 19th, and the uncertainty of where the British were heading, there was much consternation in both Baltimore and Washington, DC. Maryland militia were called out en masse, as were militia forces in Virginia and the Capital. General Tobias Stansbury's 11th Brigade of Maryland militia from Baltimore County, was one of the earliest and largest corps to rendezvous in the Bladensburg area as ordered by General Winder. General Stansbury also had some troops from western Maryland counties under his command. And he had requested troops from Baltimore City as well. Out of the militia forces of the City of Baltimore, Stansbury wrote:
“From General Stricker’s brigade in the city of Baltimore, which had been called out en masse, I required a regiment of infantry, the battalion of riflemen, and two companies of artillery – not deeming it practicable to reconcile the people of Baltimore to march a greater number, and leave it without any force.”
Of the city militia infantry regiments, Baltimore selected its best, the "Dandy 5th", to march to the defense of the Capital. The Fifth Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Sterret, along with the 1st Maryland Rifle Battalion, under Major William Pinkney, and two companies of Baltimore artillery armed with 3 6-pounders were to report to General Stansbury. The independent companies of the Fifth Regiment were hastily assembled, marching nearly 40 miles in barely two days. Most of them arrived exhausted, on the night of the 23rd. The Baltimore Yagers company was with them.
After considerable confusion and discussion over what the British landing force was up to, by the 23rd it seemed certain their target was Washington. General Winder ordered Stansbury to defend the major road junction at the town of Bladensburg, Maryland, some six miles from the Capital. Stansbury's men, after several days of digging trenches only to abandon them, then marching and countermarching in the August heat, were tired on the evening of the 23rd. The awaited Fifth Regiment did not arrive until late that afternoon. Due to the rapid assembly and march, there was little food, and no time to forage for it.
There was little sleep that night in the camps of Stansbury's brigade. Nervous sentries mistook a contractor's herd of beef cattle for a British night attack. They fired warning shots, causing exhausted militia men to rise from their tents and stand to arms. This state of alarm lasted most of the night. By morning, these troops were in good spirits, if not in the best form. They knew there would be a fight soon, it was on their home lands, and they were going to be the first line of defense.
The roads around Bladensburg were the scene of much activity on the morning of the 24th. Anne Arundel County forces, under Colonel Beall, barely crossed the bridge at Bladensburg before the British arrived. Unfortunately, Colonel Beall did not place his men at Stansbury's disposal, despite Stricker's request sent to Beall by express rider earlier that morning. Instead, Beall marched his men on to the second American line, further down the Washington post road.
At the ill-fated battle of Bladensburg on August 24th, Stansbury's brigade numbered some 2150 effectives. His battle lines were still being drawn at the time the British commenced their attack across the bridge about 1:00 PM. He later reported that someone had moved some of his regiments without informing him. Secretary of State James Monroe apparently was instrumental in this. He reportedly ordered troops repositioned to cover what he felt was a exposed left flank, and to guard the Georgetown Road. This last minute movement in the face of an enemy clearly preparing to attack, had the undesired effects of creating confusion and weakening Stansbury's forward defenses.
Stansbury's three Maryland militia infantry regiments were now 250 yards further up the hill, and no longer able to support the rifle companies and artillery down the slope. This handful of only 400-500 men were about to bear the full brunt of the British attack across the bridge and the ford above it. The two artillery companies, and Burch's artillery company higher on their left, had some well placed shots which, coupled with a hot fire from the rifle companies, initially repulsed the attack over the bridge by the British Light Infantry brigade. But the tide quickly turned as the British renewed the attack with more brigades. The rifle companies and artillery, no longer supported by infantry regiments and about to be overrun, fell back under the weight of the attack. One of the District of Columbia rifle companies on Pinkney's right, armed mostly with muskets, fired only one volley and left. It is not certain which direction the rifle companies of Gorsuch and Ducker retired to. Although most of Major Pinkney's men retired back to their parent Fifth Regiment, Captain Baden, commanding the Union Yagers (a rifle company in the 1st Rifle Battalion) was wounded and captured. Major Pinkney himself, was seriously wounded but stayed astride his horse and retired up the hill after his men.
Stansbury's three infantry regiments were now moved forward some yards to the crest of the hill to counter the British deploying into a nearby orchard. But this exposed them to rocket fire from the town across the river. The psychological shock of British rockets flying through the now exposed ranks of the militia infantry proved to be too much for many of the companies in Stansbury's command. The men in Ragan's and Schutz's regiments (levied militia for the most part and probably having little training) began to flee, casting aside their weapons. Several brave officers of these regiments were wounded while attempting to rally their men. Several companies were rallied, and continued the battle, but most of two regiments were now streaming back along the Georgetown road.
Most of the Fifth Regiment managed to steady themselves, but their volleys were proving ineffectual against the British, who had now advanced into a nearby orchard. From the protection it offered, the British were able to pour a "galling fire" into the Fifth Regiment's right flank. At least one of the Baltimore Yagers Company was wounded about this time. Meanwhile some British light infantry were extending on the left flank of the Fifth, clearly preparing to attack. Now, with both flanks exposed, and outnumbered some 4 or 5-to-1, the Fifth Regiment was ordered by General Winder to fall back to the next American line, a half mile or so to their rear. But the first American line was dissolving and falling back on the Georgetown Road, away from Washington rather than toward the second American line as Winder wished.
The British pushed on towards the second line astride the Washington Post Road. The hot action fought by Joshua Barney's flotilla men with their naval cannon, inflicted heavy losses on the advancing British columns. But with the British closing in and without good infantry support, they too finally had to limber their weapons and abandon the field. Later that night Washington, now essentially defenseless and wide open, would see the British burn many Government buildings, including the President's House. The damage was later estimated at over four million dollars -- in a time when a 100 acre farm could be had for a few hundred dollars.
Battle of North Point re-enactment web site
The citizens of Baltimore who could see the red glow in the night sky caused by the fires in Washington had no illusions what fate would befall their city if taken by the British. They would not have to wait very long to see the British plans unfold. By September 12th, with the British fleet anchored off North Point, it was clear that the British had come to deal with what they called this "nest of pirates". The preparation of the defenses of this city was not to be the hasty and ill-planned actions which preceded the burning of the capital. The citizens of Baltimore had devoted the past couple of weeks preparing in earnest for the expected British attack. Militia troops from the city and surrounding counties, reinforced with militia forces arriving from Pennsylvania and Virginia, swelled the defenders' numbers to some 14,000. And with the heavy naval guns and experienced naval crews manning them, the defensive earthworks on Hampstead Hill was meant to pose a very difficult obstacle to a land-based attack.
With British fleet movements and anchorage in Old Roads Bay off North Point on the 11th, General Samuel Smith supposed that the British would be landing there soon. He summoned General John Stricker, commander of the "City" Brigade and ordered him to advance to meet the oncoming British.
Stricker marched his 3rd Brigade forward. It was comprised of some 1500 City militia infantry, artillery and cavalry, reinforced by several companies of uniformed Pennsylvania troops. Stricker's orders were to impede, if not repulse, the British invasion force marching up Long Log Lane, towards Baltimore's southeast side.
By dusk, Stricker's column had reached the Methodist Meeting House. There he made camp for the night, after ordering some of his riflemen to proceed on another two miles ahead. He sent the small complement of cavalry another mile further, to the vicinity of the Gorsuch Farm to watch the British movements. Next morning, Stricker anxiously awaited scouting reports from his forward cavalry pickets. By 7 am he learned that British troops were actually landing in force at North Point. By mid-morning he learned the British were stopped at the Gorsuch Farm, while their officers were enjoying a leisurely breakfast.
Stricker was incensed by this news, and sent what he later called "the whole of the rifle corps" to do what they could to harass and stir the British. (These were companies from Major Pinkney's 1st Rifle Battalion, attached to the Fifth Regiment.) But the riflemen returned sooner than Stricker expected. They apparently were reacting to unfounded fears they were being cut off by British landings behind them.
Stricker, unsure of how close the British now were, next sent a small volunteer force 
forward under Major Heath. This force numbering about 300 did not go too far before encountering the now rapidly advancing British. The sounds of a small but sharp action could be heard by Stricker's men. They would only later learn that it was during this first small action at Godley Wood that rounds fired by one or more of these militiamen claimed the life of British Major General Ross. After some sharp skirmishing, Major Heath's volunteer party retired quickly back to the main forces arrayed at Bouldin farm. (Heath reported that he had had two horses shot out from under him during this action.)
Despite the unexpected loss of their popular General, the British resumed the advance and could soon be seen readying to 'display' across the open fields of the Bouldin farm. The engagement that then developed has come to be called the Battle of North Point. The men of the Fifth Regiment had received a baptism of fire at Bladensburg, but most of their companies could not stand when the other regiments began abandoning the field. Intending to display their reforged mettle, the all-militia force stood for nearly two hours against a larger and determined force of British veterans, marines and seamen.
The Baltimore Yager Company was with the Fifth Regiment arrayed before the Bouldin farm. They were initially deployed some 40-50 yards forward of Stricker's main line, in a small log house. It is not certain whether the entire company occupied or remained at this position, as it was a small building with few openings to use as firing positions. They had been given orders to set fire to the log house to deny it to the British, before falling back to the main force. As the British rocket and artillery fire had already begun, and with one British column advancing in their direction, it is not certain how long they actually remained in the log house. About to be overrun, they torched the cabin, and fell back as ordered.
One author states the Yagers were occupying 'farm buildings', apparently referring to the Bouldin house and its nearby barn and outbuildings. These structures had caught fire soon after the cannon and rocket fire began, when a British rocket fell short and hit a nearby haystack. This haystack fire quickly spread through the farm buildings and on to the farmhouse.
However, these farm buildings were rather more than musket range away from the log house the Yagers occupied. Contemporary battle maps and early 19th-century published accounts place the Yagers in the log house -- not in the Bouldin farmhouse or its nearby barn. And in retrospect, given the greater distance away from his main line and the size of these buildings, it would seem that General Stricker would have sent more than just a single company to occupy them. He had earlier sent no less than two infantry companies and elements of several of the Rifle Battalion companies forward with Major Heath against the approaching enemy. So it seems probable that had he intended to occupy the farmhouse too, he would have deployed more than one company to occupy it, being so close to a superior enemy force. Indeed, several later writers expressed surprise that Stricker did not in fact actually occupy the Bouldin farmhouse and its outbuildings. Our research indicates that no American troops were in the Bouldin farmhouse, of if they were they quickly abandoned it before the attack commenced. On the other a hand a number of accounts show that Capt. Philip B. Sadtler's Co., Baltimore Yagers was at the log house just ahead of the right center of the American line, close by to the road.
The developing British attack indicated a effort would be made to outflank Stricker's forces. The American right, anchored at the head of a creek, did not present a good option. So the British light infantry were deploying to outflank Stricker on his left. This area to the American left adjoined a swampy area at the head of Bread-and-Cheese Creek. There was reportedly much brushy undergrowth -- slow going but not impassable to the British light infantry of the period. The Fifty-First Regiment could hear -- but not see -- the British moving towards them. Despite no clear target, and getting nervous they fired a hasty volley; then panicked and melted away through the woods in the rear.
Stricker was determined, and would not let this be another Bladensburg. Despite the shameful retreat by the Fifty-First regiment, there was a much recounted spirited defense at North Point by the Fifth, Twenty-Seventh and Thirty-Ninth Regiments, and their attached 1st Rifle Battalion and artillery companies. The British suffered significantly greater casualties than did the American militia force. This may well have shown the now acting British commander, Col. Arthur Brooke, that the militia would indeed fight hard to defend their city.
Stricker's outnumbered force, after inflicting no small loss on the British, withdrew in good order. They regrouped with the Sixth Regiment which had been held in reserve further back, and rested briefly. But Colonel Brooke did not renew his advance, also electing to rest his exhausted force. Seeing no further British advance, Stricker decided to withdraw his force back up Long Log Lane to Worthington's Mill, not far from the extensive defenses at Hampstead (or Loudenslager) Hill (area of what is now Patterson Park.) The next day brought soaking rains, but Col. Brooke renewed his advance on the City and was in sight of the Hampstead Hill defenses by about 10 am on the 13th. Defended by a large portion of the nearly 15,000 militia assembled in Baltimore from Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, strongly supported by naval artillery guns, the hilltop defenses must have presented a formidable sight to Col. Brooke.
Meantime, in a much retold story, the British fleet failed in their attempt to reduce Ft. McHenry at the mouth of Baltimore harbor, on the night of the 13th and into the early hours of the 14th. The British land forces would not have critical support of the shipboard naval guns. Without this supporting fire to disrupt the defensive lines on Hampstead Hill, there was little chance of success on the ground. On the night of the 13th, to the backdrop of lightning and the flashes of bombs bursting over Ft. McHenry, the American forces peered warily down from Hampstead Hill at British campfires. They did not know until soon after dawn that the British land force had stolen away. There were calls for a counterattack. But General Samuel Smith chose not to risk any more of his citizen's lives, instead sending only a small cavalry force to shadow the British land force's march back to embark their ships at North Point. The invasion fleet set sail on the 17th. Baltimore was saved, and the crisis of 1814 was over.
Document Last Updated: 09/12/2007
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Web Published: 03 September 2005